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Abstract
Social interaction with colleagues is an important job attribute for
many workers. To attract and retain workers, managers therefore need
to think about how to create and preserve high-quality co-worker re-
lationships. This paper develops a principal-multi-agent model where
agents do not only engage in productive activities, but also in social
interaction with their colleagues, which in turn creates co-worker al-
truism. We study how financial incentives for productive activities can
improve or damage the work climate. We show that both team incen-
tives and relative incentives can help to create a good work climate.
We discuss some empirical evidence supporting these predictions.
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1 Introduction
Social interaction with colleagues is a highly valued job aspect for many work-
ers. Research in psychology, sociology, and management shows that receiving
affective support from colleagues and having good interpersonal relationships
at work are positively associated with job satisfaction, job involvement, and
organizational commitment, and negatively with employee stress and ab-
senteeism (see among others Price and Mueller 1981, Riordan and Griffeth
1995, Hodson 1997, Ducharme and Martin 2000, Nielsen et al. 2000, Morri-
son 2004, and Wagner and Harter 2006). Moreover, turnover intentions and
actual turnover tend to be lower when workers experience social support from
co-workers (Price and Mueller 1981, Riordan and Griffeth 1995, Nielsen et al.
2000, Morrison 2004, and Mossholder et al. 2005). Social interaction with
colleagues is also one of the most missed job aspects under retired workers in
Australia (Shacklock 2005) — and it is one of the main drivers of job search
among Dutch unemployed (Echtelt and Hoff 2008). Lastly, using time-use
data for France and the US, Krueger and Schkade (2007) show that workers
who are in jobs that entail more frequent interactions with co-workers are
more satisfied with their jobs and in a better mood during work time.
These findings have a clear managerial implication: In their struggle to
attract and retain workers, managers should strive to create and maintain
high-quality co-worker relationships. This view is confirmed by managers.
Berman et al. (2002) report the results of a survey among managers in the
US and show that more than 85% of managers approve or strongly approve of
workplace friendships. A similar percentage reports that their organization
actively encourages workplace friendship. An obvious and widely used means
of doing so is to facilitate social interaction among co-workers through e.g.
creating coffee corners or a nice canteen, having Friday-afternoon drinks, or
organizing after-work social events (Cohen and Prusak 2001). However, as
we shall see, when a company’s workplace policies are limited to facilitating
social interaction, typically too little social interaction takes place, implying
lower than first-best profits.
This paper studies an alternative, complementary way to promote co-
worker relationships: fine-tuning workers’ financial incentives. We develop a
principal-multi-agent model in which workers do not only engage in produc-
tive activities, but also in social interaction with their colleagues. Workers’
productive activities are, for convenience, assumed to be fully contractible.
Social interaction, however, is not contractible at all. We model social inter-
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action as an exchange of ‘attention’ between workers. Attention may include
showing interest in a colleague’s personal life, offering a drink after working
hours, or any other kind gestures. While receipt of attention is always val-
ued positively by workers, giving attention is assumed to be costly, at least
above a certain level of attention. The reason is clear: Although giving some
attention can evidently be pleasurable, it is also time-consuming, expensive,
or perhaps even boresome at some point. In addition to these direct benefits
and costs, we assume that social interaction creates altruistic feelings among
colleagues. More specifically, we assume that receipt of attention leads to
stronger feelings of altruism towards the giving agent. As we shall see, in
equilibrium this gives rise to reciprocal behavior: When a worker has been
treated kindly by a colleague, the worker cares more about his colleague’s
well-being, and adapts his future actions accordingly.
We obtain two main results. First, when the firm provides only individ-
ual performance incentives, too little social interaction takes place, imply-
ing lower than first-best profits for the firm. The reason is an externality
problem. Each worker internalizes the benefits of giving attention to his
co-workers in as far as he is altruistic towards his co-workers. Since people
care more for themselves than they do for their colleagues, there is too little
social interaction in equilibrium. This is costly to the firm: If the firm could
induce workers to engage in more social interaction, workers’ job satisfaction
would be higher, allowing the firm to pay lower wages. Borzaga and Depedri
(2005) have recently provided some evidence for such compensating wage
differentials. They find that, in Italian non-profit organizations, satisfaction
with colleagues is negatively associated with wages. Consistent with this,
the field study by Hamilton et al. (2003) shows that quite a few workers
of a Californian garment factory were willing to give up a substantial part
of their salary so as to join team production, suggesting high non-pecuniary
benefits from working in a team.
Second, the firm can promote social interaction among workers by in-
cluding team incentives or relative incentives in the workers’ contract. Con-
sequently, the firm can achieve first-best profits by choosing the right mix of
individual incentives and team or relative incentives. The intuition behind
these results is as follows. Provision of team or relative incentives creates
externalities among workers. Team incentives create positive effort exter-
nalities, implying underprovision of effort (free-riding); relative incentives
create negative effort externalities, resulting in overprovision of effort from
the perspective of the workers. These externality problems are less severe
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when workers are more altruistic towards each other. Hence, contracts with
team or relative incentives strengthen workers’ incentives to invest in co-
worker altruism. A natural way to do so is to engage in social interaction
with colleagues. In other words, by deliberately creating an additional exter-
nality problem among workers through provision of either team or relative
incentives, firms induce workers to resolve the initial externality problem of
too little attention provision. Incentives for productive activities are restored
through fine-tuning the level of individual incentives. Optimal contracts thus
induce workers to exert first-best effort and to give first-best attention. Con-
sequently, the firm achieves first-best profits.
Our model’s predictions concerning the effect of team and relative in-
centives on the quality of co-worker relationships and workers’ effort are
supported by existing empirical findings. Firstly, there is evidence based on
survey data. In their analysis of the German Socioeconomic Panel, Hey-
wood et al. (2005) find some evidence for the view that promotions and
profit-sharing are alternative means of generating cooperation among work-
ers. Their measure of cooperation is workers’ response to the question "Do
you get along with your colleagues?", which is close in spirit to the quality
of interpersonal relationships that we focus on. Heywood and Wei (2006)
examine data from the National Longitudinal Study of Youth (US) and find
that co-worker satisfaction is significantly higher for workers who recently re-
ceived a promotion. No such relation is found between co-worker satisfaction
and individual performance pay, profit-sharing, or the wage level.
A potential problem with evidence based on survey data is reversed
causality: It may well be that high-quality co-worker relations are a determi-
nant rather than the result of team or relative incentives. Field experiments
circumvent this problem. Rotemberg (1994) discusses the famous Hawthorne
experiments (Roethlisberger and Dickson 1939) where both workers’ finan-
cial incentives and their opportunities for socializing were varied. The results
suggest that team incentives encouraged friendship among workers and that
this friendship was instrumental in raising output. More recently, Verbeke et
al. (2008) ran a field experiment in a chain of shoe shops in the Netherlands.
Team incentives for employees were introduced (on top of their hourly wages)
in a random sample of the 125 shoe shops during a period of six weeks. After
the experiment, a survey was held among employees. The results show posi-
tive effects of team incentives on social interaction among workers as well as
on sales.
Lastly, the field study by Bandiera et al. (2005) compares fruit pickers’
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productivity under individual incentives and relative incentives. Their re-
sults strongly suggest that, when workers are paid on the basis of relative
performance, they partially internalize the negative externality their effort
imposes on others, especially when working alongside their friends. They do
not find evidence for pure altruism, however. One reason for this could be
that workers in their sample are hired on a daily basis, with no guarantee of
further employment, giving little incentives to build up relationships.
This paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we give a brief
overview of related literature and discuss how our paper contributes to it.
Section 3 presents the model. In section 4 and 5 we examine the case of per-
fect contractibility and the case of non-contractible attention, respectively.
Section 6 concludes.
2 Related literature
Our paper builds on Rotemberg’s (1994) seminal analysis of human rela-
tions in the workplace. He argues that, when workers’ actions are strategic
complements and workers are paid as a function of joint output, they may
rationally choose to become altruistic towards each other. Altruism serves
as a commitment device to exert more effort, which — due to the strategic
complementarity of workers’ efforts — induces co-workers also to exert more
effort. This is in the worker’s narrow self-interest because of the free-rider
problem inherent in team incentives.
We differ from his analysis in three important respects. First, while
Rotemberg studies the effect of team incentives in isolation, we derive the
properties of first-best contracts which are shown to consist of a mix of differ-
ent types of incentives. Second, in contrast to Rotemberg, strategic comple-
mentarity between workers’ productive actions is not a necessary condition
for co-worker altruism to arise in our model. The reason is that we allow
for a consumption benefit from social interaction at work, which is absent in
Rotemberg. Last, and most important, we do not allow people to directly
choose their altruistic feelings towards others. Instead, we assume that peo-
ple may attempt to make others feel more altruistic towards them by being
kind, showing attention, paying respect, offering favors, and so on. Thus,
while as in Rotemberg an individual’s altruistic feelings are endogenous in
our model, the individual does not choose his feelings, but his feelings can
be affected by other people’s actions.
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The way we model social interaction between workers and how it affects
co-workers’ altruism is close to the formalization of social ties in van Dijk and
van Winden (1997). In their model, as in ours, social ties are represented by
interdependent utility functions, where the weight assigned to the utility of
the other agent depends on the history of interaction.1 The positive relation-
ship between social interaction and the formation of social ties is supported
by a large number of empirical studies in several branches of the social sci-
ences. For example, Homans (1950) concludes from observations of workers
at the Western Electric Company that "favourable sentiments increase as
interaction increases" (p. 112). Additional support for this hypothesis can
be found in Baumeister and Leary (1995), van Dijk, Sonnemans, and van
Winden (2002), and Hays (1988). We differ from van Dijk and van Winden
(1997) in the application, as they analyze the influence of social ties on the
contribution to a public good. Further, we do not make the assumption
that individuals are myopic with respect to the feelings of a colleague; in-
stead workers may invest in social relationships for strategic reasons, e.g. to
alleviate externality problems.
In another related approach, Cox, Friedman, and Gjerstad (2007) have
developed a model where the marginal rate of substitution between an agent’s
own income and the income of another is influenced by actions of this other
agent. In particular, an agent becomes more willing to pay for the income
of the other agent, i.e. becomes more altruistic, if the other agent has been
more generous to the former. Recently, Cox, Friedman and Sadiraj (2008)
formulated a similar theory in a more general (nonparametric) framework
of preferences over one’s own and other people’s payoffs. Both papers dis-
cuss results of existing laboratory experiments to validate the model. The
results of these experiments indicate that people do become more altruistic
in response to kind behavior.
The results of our analysis are in stark contrast to those of Lazear (1989)
on sabotage in tournaments and of Kandel and Lazear (1992) on peer pressure
in teams. These papers predict worse rather than better co-worker relations
under relative or team incentives compared to individual incentives (see also
Barron and Gjerde 1997). While we obviously do not deny that sabotage
and peer pressure are relevant in many settings (see e.g. the experiences at
1In a related approach by Bolle and Kritikos (2006), the altruism parameter is not
defined as the weight assigned to the utility of the other agent, but as the marginal utility
of a transfer to another agent. However, like in van Dijk and van Winden (1997), this
altruism parameter depends on the past interaction with this agent.
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Continental Airlines described in Knez and Simester 2001 and the study on
‘dirty play’ in professional soccer by Garicano and Palacios-Huerta 2005), the
empirical evidence discussed in the previous section strongly suggests that
opposite forces such as those studied in this paper can sometimes dominate.
The economics literature provides two alternative ways through which
team-based pay may improve upon the work climate: by increasing workers’
willingness to help each other and by reducing pay inequity at the work-
place. Studies stressing workers’ helping behavior include FitzRoy and Kraft
(1986), Drago and Turnbull (1988), Itoh (1991), Rob and Zemsky (2002),
and Corneo and Rob (2003). A crucial difference between these studies and
ours is that helping or cooperating is assumed productive in these studies,
implying that there is a team-element in production, which is not necessarily
the case in our model. Our paper can thus explain the prevalence of team-
based pay and their positive effects on the work climate, even when there is
little or no complementarity between workers’ productive efforts. The same
holds for studies which consider inequity-averse workers (see Bartling 2007,
Demougin and Fluet 2006, Englmaier and Wambach 2005, Goel and Thakor
2006, Grund and Sliwka 2005, Itoh 2004, and Rey-Biel 2007). When workers
dislike pay inequality, team incentives may outperform both individual and
relative incentives, because team incentives generate little inequality of pay
among workers. We differ from these studies in that workers are altruis-
tic rather than inequity-averse, and that workers’ altruism is endogenously
determined. One implication is that — in line with the empirical evidence
discussed in the previous section — the introduction of team-based incentives
on top of flat wages increases the quality of co-worker relations in our model,
while it is neutral in models of inequity aversion. Moreover, our results on
the effects of relative incentives are also clearly different from those that arise
when workers are inequity averse.
3 The model
We consider a profit-maximizing principal who employs two homogenous
agents.2 Agents produce output by exerting effort. Effort of agent i is de-
2Our results generalize to the case of an arbitrary number n > 1 of agents. Details are
available upon request.
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noted by ei ≥ 0. Total profits of the principal are:
π = Q(ei, ej)− wi − wj,
where the production function Q satisfies the Inada conditions with respect
to all inputs, and wi denotes agent i’s wage.
Agents care about three things: their wage, their cost of effort, and their
net benefit from social interaction with colleagues. We model social interac-
tion as an exchange of attention between agents. We assume that receiving
attention is pleasurable, while giving attention is costly.3 The utility function
of agent i is:
Ui = wi − C(ei, aij) +G(aji) + F (aji, Uj), (1)
where aij ≥ 0 denotes the attention given by agent i to agent j. The cost
function C is strictly convex and increasing in both arguments and satisfies
the conditions C(0, 0) = 0, Ce(0, aij) = 0, and Ca(ei, 0) = 0, where sub-
scripts to functions denote partial derivatives. For simplicity, we assume
that Cea(·) = 0; in the concluding remarks, we discuss some implications of
relaxing this assumption. Receiving attention generates two types of bene-
fits to an agent, represented by the functions G and F . First, we allow for
a consumption benefit from attention, captured by the strictly concave and
increasing function G, with Ga(0) −→ +∞. Second, we assume that receipt
of attention leads to feelings of altruism for the giving agent, which increases
the utility of the receiving agent when the giving agent has positive utility.
This is captured by the function F (aji, Uj) = γajiUj, where γ > 0. The
specific functional form keeps the analysis tractable.4 To ensure an interior
solution, we shall abstract from situations where Fu ≥ 1. That is, agents al-
ways care more for themselves than for others. Last, note that the linearity
of utility in income implies that the agent is risk-neutral.
The principal offers a contract to each agent that makes each agent at
least as well off as his outside option U > 0. The principal can condition
3These assumptions are stronger than we need: They only need to hold at the margin
in the optimum. For instance, allowing agents to enjoy giving attention up to some point
would not change our results qualitatively.
4Note that it is easy to extend the function to allow for unconditional altruism or spite,
e.g. F (aji, Uj) = γ(aji+φ)Uj , where φ 6= 0. This would not affect our results qualitatively
except for situations where unconditional spite is very strong so that creation of co-worker
altruism through social interaction is inefficient.
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the agent’s wage on the effort of the agent himself and also on the effort
of his colleague (wi(ei, ej)). We shall speak of individual incentives when
wiei(ei, ej) > 0, of team incentives when w
i
ej(ei, ej) > 0, and of relative incen-
tives when wiej(ei, ej) < 0.
The timing of the game is as follows. In the first stage, the principal
offers contracts to the agents, which they accept or reject. Next, agents
decide simultaneously and independently how much attention to give to their
co-worker. In the last stage, agents decide on the level of effort they exert.
4 Complete contract
We start by studying the benchmark case where both effort and attention are
contractible. Full contractibility implies that there is no reason to condition
the wage on effort, and so an agent’s compensation only consists of a base
salary in this section. The principal’s optimization problem is:
max
ei,ej ,aij ,aji,wi,wj
Q(ei, ej)− wi − wj (2)
subject to the agents’ participation constraints:
wi − C(ei, aij) +G(aji) + F (aji, Uj) ≥ U, (3)
wj − C(ej, aji) +G(aij) + F (aij, Ui) ≥ U. (4)
The first-best levels of effort and attention are described in Proposition 1.
Proposition 1 The complete contract has the following properties:
1. Effort of each agent is strictly positive and equates the marginal benefits
of effort to the principal with the marginal cost of effort to the agent:
Qe(·) = Ce(·);
2. Attention by each agent is strictly positive and equates the receiving
agent’s marginal benefits with the giving agent’s marginal cost of atten-
tion: Ga(·) + Fa(·) = Ca(·).
3. The wage makes each agent indifferent between accepting and rejecting
the contract, given the first-best levels of effort and attention: w =
U + C(·)−G(·)− F (·).
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The proof is given in the appendix. As usual, the first-best contract in-
duces agents to exert the level of effort that maximizes the joint surplus. The
principal optimally includes a positive level of attention in the contract. Even
though attention entails a cost for the giving agent, it produces a pleasant
working environment for the receiving agent, which allows the principal to
pay a lower wage.
5 Incomplete contracts
Next let us consider the more realistic case where workers’ attention is not
contractible; the principal cannot contract on workers’ actions like showing
interest in a colleague’s personal life, treating colleagues with courtesy, or
giving affective support. We keep the assumption of contractible effort.5 As
we shall see, the principal finds it optimal to condition each agent’s wage
on the effort of both agents, w(ei, ej). We solve the maximization problem
of the principal by backward induction, starting with the agent’s choice of
effort.
The first-order condition for agent i’s optimal effort is described by:
wiei(·) + wjei(·)Fuj(·)− Cei(·) = 0. (5)
Effort has three effects on an agent’s utility. First, when the principal gives
individual incentives, the agent’s wage increases with his effort. Second,
when the principal has installed team incentives or relative incentives, agent
i’s effort choice affects agent j’s income. Agent i cares about this effect to
the extent that he is altruistic towards his colleague. Last, there is a cost of
providing effort. The optimal effort level equates these benefits and costs at
the margin.
The comparative static effect of social interaction on the agent’s effort is
summarized in the following Lemma.
5None of the results change when effort is noncontractible as long as the principal can
contract on a (noisy) signal of each agent’s effort (e.g. output). Extending the model to
allow for risk aversion of agents in the presence of noisy signals of effort does not affect
our results qualitatively.
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Lemma 1 Social interaction affects the agent’s choice of effort as follows:
1. The effect of received attention on effort is described by:
dei
daji
=
Fujaji(·)wjei(·)
Ceiei(·)
, (6)
implying that an agent’s effort increases with received attention when
the contract includes team incentives, while effort decreases with re-
ceived attention when the contract includes relative incentives.
2. Attention given by agent i has no effect on his effort:
dei
daij
= 0.
The first part of Lemma 1 echoes the results by Rotemberg (1994) and
Bandiera et al. (2005) on the relation between co-worker altruism and effort.
When workers care for one another, they partly take into account the ex-
ternalities they impose on others. Compared to egoistic agents, this implies
higher effort under team incentives and lower effort under relative incentives.
As co-worker altruism increases with received attention, effort increases with
attention under team incentives and it decreases with attention under relative
incentives. The second part of Lemma 1 directly follows from the separabil-
ity of effort cost and attention cost in the worker’s utility function. Clearly,
when effort and attention would be substitutes, agent’s effort would decrease
with attention given by the agent. We will elaborate on this in the concluding
section.
In the previous stage of the game, the agents decide independently on
how much attention to give to their co-worker, taking into account the effect
of their attention on effort in the next stage of the game. The first-order
condition for agent’s optimal attention is:
dUi
daij
= −Caij(·) +
dUj
daij
Fuj(·) +
dei
daij
dUi
dei
+
dej
daij
dUi
dej
= 0. (7)
Using the agents’ first-order conditions for optimal effort (5), this can be
simplified to:
−Caij(·) +
dUj
daij
Fuj(·) +
dej
daij
dUi
dej
= 0. (8)
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Besides the direct cost of attention provision, giving attention has two effects
on the agent’s utility. First, when the agent has altruistic feelings towards
his co-worker, he enjoys the increase in his co-worker’s utility resulting from
the receipt of attention. Differentiating (1), it follows that the increase in
the co-worker’s utility is:
dUj
daij
= Gaij(·) + Faij(·) + Fui(·)
dUi
daij
, (9)
where the last term drops by the envelop theorem, using (7). Second, there is
an indirect effect of attention provision through the co-worker’s effort choice:
By giving more attention, the agent induces the co-worker to change his
level of effort in the next stage, which in turn affects the agent’s utility.
Differentiating (1) it follows that:
dUi
dej
= wiej(·) + Fuj(·)
dUj
dej
= wiej(·), (10)
where the last equality follows from applying the envelop theorem, using the
first-order condition for optimal effort (5). Clearly, an agent’s utility is only
affected by his co-worker’s effort when the contract includes team incentives
or relative performance incentives. Similarly, we learned from Lemma 1 that
a worker’s effort is only affected by received attention when the contract has
team or relative incentives. Taking these two results together, it follows that
the last term of the first-order condition (8) is strictly positive when either
team incentives or relative incentives are part of the agent’s contract. That
is, both team incentives and relative incentives create an additional marginal
benefit from attention provision for each agent. This benefit stems from the
effect of attention-giving on co-worker altruism and, hence, on effort. When
the contract has team incentives, an agent’s provision of attention induces the
other agent to exert more effort in the next stage, which benefits the agent.
Likewise, when the contract has relative incentives, the agent’s provision of
attention induces the other agent to exert less effort in the next stage, which
again benefits the agent. Lemma 2 follows.
Lemma 2 Both team incentives and relative incentives promote social in-
teraction among workers.
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Substituting (6), (9) and (10) into (8) gives agent i’s first-order condition
for optimal attention in a rewritten form:
−Caij(·) + Fuj(·)
£
Gaij(·) + Faij(·)
¤
+
Fuiaij(·)wiej(·)
Cejej(·)
wiej(·) = 0. (11)
Our next result follows immediately and is described in the following Propo-
sition.
Proposition 2 When the principal does not provide team incentives or rel-
ative incentives (wiej = 0 for all i 6= j), there is too little social interaction in
equilibrium.
Proposition 2 follows from a comparison of the first-order condition for
attention (11) with first-best attention as described by Proposition 1. In the
absence of team or relative incentives, the last term of first-order condition
(11) drops. Comparing with the first-best as described by Proposition 1,
it follows that there is too little social interaction in any equilibrium where
Fu < 1, as we have imposed. That is: As agents care less about their co-
worker than about themselves, the benefits from attention provision are not
fully internalized. Underprovision of attention results. Note that there exist
multiple equilibria. First, an equilibrium exists where neither of the agents
give attention. When an agent believes that the other agent will not give
any attention, the second term of (11) is zero, implying that the agent only
faces costs from attention provision (as reflected by the first term of (11)).
Hence, given that an agent expects to receive no attention, it is optimal for
him to give no attention as well. Second, depending on the exact shape of
the functions, one or more equilibria with positive attention exist. When the
function G(·), representing the consumption benefits from attention, is suffi-
ciently concave, or the cost function C(·) is sufficiently convex in attention,
there is a unique equilibrium with strictly positive attention.6 Anyway, since
in all possible equilibria attention is described by (11), attention is always
6The appendix describes the precise condition; it rules out that agent’s responsiveness
to received attention increases with received attention. In the remainder of this paper, we
shall assume that this condition holds.
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lower than first-best. As a result, the principal’s profits are also lower than
first-best.7
Last, consider the principal’s contract design problem. For convenience,
suppose that the wage contract is linear in both ei and ej. This is innocuous:
As will become clear, the principal can not do better by offering nonlinear
contracts. Let wiei denote agent i’s bonus per unit of effort provided by agent
i (representing individual incentives) and let wiej denote agent i’s bonus per
unit of effort provided by agent j (representing team or relative incentives).
Further, let si be agent i’s base salary. Then, the principal’s optimization
problem is given by:
max
wiei ,w
i
ej
,wjej ,w
j
ei ,s
i,sj
Q(ei, ej)− (wiei + w
j
ei)ei − (w
i
ej + w
j
ej)ej − s
i − sj,
subject to the agents’ participation constraints (3) and (4). First-best effort,
attention, and profits are achieved by the incentive contract described in
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 When attention cannot be contracted, but effort can, the
principal achieves first-best profits by offering an incentive contract consist-
ing of a base salary, individual incentives, and team or relative incentives.
Optimal individual incentives are described by:
wiei = Qei(·)− Fuj(·)wjei for i 6= j,
and optimal team or relative incentives are described by:
wiej = ±
s
(1− Fuj(·)) [Gai(·) + Fai(·)]Cee(·)
Fuiaij(·)
for i 6= j,
where all functions are evaluated at the first-best levels of effort and attention,
as described by Proposition 1. The level of the base salary follows from the
agents’ participation constraints.
7Note that, since this result holds for any level of the cost of attention, companies that
restrict their workplace policies to facilitating social interaction (that is, reducing agent’s
marginal cost of attention) will achieve lower than first-best profits.
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The proof is in the appendix. The principal can obtain maximum profits
by including a mix of individual incentive pay and team or relative incentive
pay in the contract. As we have seen in Lemma 2, team or relative incen-
tives can be used to promote social interaction. In the optimum, the team
incentives or relative incentives are chosen such that, given first-best effort,
the agents provide first-best attention as described in Proposition 1. Next,
the principal can ensure that agents exert first-best effort by adjusting the
individual incentives. When attention provision is stimulated through team
incentives, individual incentives are muted, since an agent enjoys the pos-
itive effect his effort has on his colleague’s wage. With relative incentives,
the effort of an agent negatively influences the utility of his co-worker, which
in equilibrium is an additional cost of effort. Individual incentives therefore
need to be adjusted upwards to restore efficient effort provision.
6 Concluding remarks
For many employees, social interaction with colleagues is one of the key de-
terminants of job satisfaction. We have studied the influence of financial
incentives for productive activities on the quality of co-worker relationships
in a model where agents have endogenous other-regarding preferences. Fol-
lowing earlier work on the formation of social ties, we have assumed that
the strength of a worker’s altruistic feelings towards a colleague is increasing
with the colleague’s kindness towards the worker. We have seen that, absent
team or relative incentives, workers do not invest enough in their relation-
ships with their co-workers, as the benefits from relationship-building to the
colleague are not fully internalized. This externality problem comes at a cost
to the employer, as good co-worker relationships allow employers to attract
and retain workers without paying high wages. We have shown that em-
ployers can stimulate social interaction among colleagues by providing either
team incentives or relative incentives. These results are well in line with the
empirical evidence discussed in the introduction.
We have deliberately kept the analysis as simple as possible. An inter-
esting next step would be to consider additional interdependencies between
attention and effort provision. For instance, giving and receiving attention
takes time and, hence, may increase worker’s marginal cost of effort. On
the other hand, as shown by some of the studies we discussed in the intro-
duction, social contact with colleagues can reduce stress and increase job
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involvement. In practice, both of these arguments are likely to play a role,
which may explain why the empirical evidence on the relation between worker
cohesiveness and productivity is rather mixed (see Rotemberg 2006 for an
overview). Further, it would be interesting to study situations where the em-
ployer can only contract on team output, so that team incentives serve a dual
role: promoting productive effort and stimulating social interaction. In such
situations, too much social interaction may arise (as strong team incentives
may be optimal to boost production, but as a side-effect create too much
concern among workers to please each other). In response to this, employers
may take actions so as to increase workers’ cost of giving attention. Other in-
teresting extensions include heterogeneity in workers’ social preferences and
the sorting of different types of workers to firms offering different incentive
schemes. Kosfeld and von Siemens (2007, 2008) make interesting steps in
that direction.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
Let λi denote the Lagrange-multiplier for the participation constraint of agent
i. The first-order conditions are:
Qei(·) + λi
dUi
dei
+ λj
dUj
dei
= 0; Qej(·) + λi
dUi
dej
+ λj
dUj
dej
= 0; (A1)
λi
dUi
daij
+ λj
dUj
daij
= 0; λi
dUi
daji
+ λj
dUj
daji
= 0; (A2)
−1 + λi
dUi
dwi
+ λj
dUj
dwi
= 0; −1 + λi
dUi
dwj
+ λj
dUj
dwj
= 0; (A3)
and the two participation constraints. Using (A1) and (A3) and noting that
dUj
dei
= Fu(·)dUidei ,
dUj
dwi
= Fu(·)dUidwi ,
dUi
dei
µ
dUi
dwi
¶−1
= −Ce(·),
the first part of Proposition 1 follows. Substituting
dUi
daij
= −Ca(·) + Fu(·)dUjdaij
dUj
daij
= Ga(·) + Fa(·) + Fu(·)dUidai
into (A2) yields after successive substitution:
[−Ca(·) +Ga(·) + Fa(·)]
£
1 + Fu(·) + F 2u (·) + ...+ F∞u (·)
¤
= 0,
from which the second part of Proposition 1 follows. The third part follows
from (A1) and (A3) which imply that λi = λj > 0, and hence the participa-
tion constraints bind.
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Condition for unique equilibrium with strictly positive attention
Agent i’s best-response curve has the following slope:
daij
daji
= −d
2Ui/daijdaji
d2Ui/da2ij
= −
Fujaji(·)
£
Gaij(·) + Faij(·)
¤
+ Fuj(·)Faijui(·) dUidaji
−Caijaij(·) + Fuj(·)Gaijaij(·)
,
(B1)
where
dUi
daji
= Gaji(·) + Faji(·) + Fuj
dUj
daji
. (B2)
Note that at the origin the slope of the best-response curve is infinitely large,
as Gaij(0) → +∞. Hence, to ensure that there is a unique equilibrium
with strictly positive attention, it is sufficient that the best-response curve
is strictly concave when daij/daji > 0. The second derivative of the best-
response curve is given by the following expression:
d2aij
(daji)2
= −
(d3Ui/daijda2ji)(d2Ui/da2ij)− (d3Ui/da2ijdaji)(d2Ui/daijdaji)¡
d2Ui/da2ij
¢2 ,
where d2Ui/da2ij and d3Ui/da2ijdaji are always negative by the second-order
condition and by the concavity of theG(·) function, respectively, and d2Ui/daijdaji
is always positive in the relevant area where daij/daji > 0 (see (B1)). Hence,
a sufficient (but not necessary) condition for the best-response function to
be strictly concave when daij/daji > 0 is:
d3Ui/daijda2ji = 2γ
2
£
−Caji(·) + γaij
¡
Gaji(·) + γUi
¢¤
+
γ2aji
©
−Cajiaji(·) + γaij
£
Gajiaji(·) + γ (dUi/daji)
¤ª
< 0 (B3)
which is satisfied when the G(·) function is sufficiently concave or the C(·)
function is sufficiently convex in attention.
Proof of Proposition 3
The agent’s choice of attention is described by first-order condition (11).
Comparing with Proposition 1, to achieve first-best attention, the principal
should set incentives such that the last two terms of (11) equal Ga(·)+Fa(·),
or:
Fuj(·)
£
Gaij(·) + Faij(·)
¤
+
Fuiaij(·)wiej
Cejej(·)
wiej = Ga(·) + Fa(·).
Solving for wiej gives the expression for relative or team incentives in Propo-
sition 3. The optimal level of individual incentives follows along similar lines,
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using first-order condition (5) and the expression for first-best effort in Propo-
sition 1. Lastly, note that we do not need to be concerned about multiplicity
of equilibria since, first, the equilibrium where both workers abstain from giv-
ing attention is no longer an equilibrium when wiej 6= 0, and, second, there
exists only one equilibrium with strictly positive attention when condition
(B3) holds, which is assumed.
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